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Philosophical Disputes in Social Work:
Social Justice Denied
DENNIS SALEEBEY
The University of Kansas
School of Social Welfare
The debate in the social work academy about the pertinence of
empiricist/positivist modes of knowing and doing is epistemological in
character. It is the argument of this essay that prior ontological questions
must be answered before the profession of social work can profitably enter
this debate. These questions center on the nature of social work, the
symbolic and moral essence of the social work enterprise and what the
profession is becoming.
The profession of social work as actually practiced could
hardly be accused of a mania for a positivist tools for practice
(Welch, 1983). The social work academy, however, is buzzing
with a debate about the relevance of such tools and their ac-
companying presuppositions for practice (Fischer, 1981, 1984;
Gordon, 1983; Heineman (Pieper), 1981; Hudson, 1982; Karger,
1983; Ruckdeschel and Farris, 1981; Brekke, 1986; Weick, 1987).
The debate, now soft and insinuated, now loud and bitter,
centers on selecting either a rigorous or a relevant epistemology
to guide social work education, practice, and research.
It is the intent of this essay to briefly assay and critique core
elements of the debate; to account for the ostensible and pre-
mature resolution of the debate; to argue that prior questions
must be answered before the epistemological conflicts can be
reasonably resolved; and to suggest that these prior questions
are ontological and to suppose how they might be answered.
The Debate
If the debate is about the fundamental epistemology of social
work knowledge and practice it is about questions of how pro-
fessionals know, how professional knowing is different from
mundane knowing, and how professionals come to know, eval-
uate, and characterize their practice. The roots of the debate
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extend back for centuries, fertilized extensively by Enlighten-
ment fomenting over the best avenues to apprehend and control
elements of the universe in the interest of "progress" and "free-
dom" (Gay, 1969). The empiricist contends that all knowledge
must be based on the perceptions of the senses. Such knowledge
can be systematically gathered and accumulated, and its validity
put to the test by standard method and instrumentation. Ratio-
nalists on the other hand, argue that the mind inevitably
enlarges, shapes, and or imbues impressions gained from sen-
sory, empirical experience. Another related facet of the debate,
again embedded in our past, is the tension between realists and
idealists, the former asserting that the objects of our knowing
are, in fact, real and have an existence apart from us and they
can be known as they exist, while the latter posit that these
objects are to some degree, a product of mind's intention, experi-
ence, and desire (Popper, 1982; Eccles, 1980).
In the social work academy, this hoary debate can be exem-
plified by the exchange between Martha Heineman-Pieper (1981;
1985) and Walter Hudson (1982). Others have contributed to this
occasionally acrimonious dialogue, not the least of whom are
Joel Fischer (1981, 1984) and William Gordon (1983, 1984)
(although the irony of their particular foofaraw is that they both,
as Haworth (1986) has pointed out, are empiricists). Heineman-
Pieper believes that the positivist approach to understanding
human experience is naive, inadequate to such a task and may
even falsify, in its reliance on measurement, the essence of
human experience. She asserts, in summarizing critiques of pos-
itivism from a variety of fields, that what is unique about human
experience is that it is formed and can only be known in inter-
action, participation, and dialogue (Heineman-Pieper, 1985).
Hudson (1982), on the other hand, puts it quite directly: "Con-
structs that cannot be defined, operationalized, and then mea-
sured are mentalisms that are useless to an understanding of the
world in which we live" (p. 256).
This pale summary on the central issues at hand indicate that
its substance is, in fact, epistemological, although there are those
who have tried to extend the argument beyond questions of
knowing (Weick, 1987). Confusions and conflicts over the nature
of practice knowledge and the state of mind of the practitioner
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have obscured prior questions that must be analyzed, appreci-
ated, and answered before the epistemological issues can be
reasonably grappled with: questions about the very nature of
social work and what social work is becoming; that is to
say, what exactly is the essence of the profession of social
work's being?
These are ontological questions; and require inquiry directed
to the existential basis of the profession. If social work as a
profession, merely deals with questions about knowing, how-
ever constructively, we stand in danger of the tail wagging the
dog, the method dictating the meaning, a prospect that fore-
bodes the devolution of social work into technique or technol-
ogy. To embarrass an old biological saw, in this case ontology
must precede epistemology.
The Debate: Resolution by Default
Other forces and developments move to harden the debate
and to assure a resolution in the direction of what Donald Sch6n
(1983) calls the Technical/Rationalist or empiricist model of
thinking and acting.
The most stentorian note sounded in the blare of the debate
has been the rise of professionalism to unprecedented hege-
mony in authoring social decisions. In our culture, professions
have become the standard-bearers of science and its progeny,
technology. The prevailing definition of the concept of profes-
sion would denote something like "... professional activity
consists in instrumental problem-solving made vigorous by the
application of scientific theory and technique" (Sch6n, 1983, p.
21). Ernest Greenwood (1957) in a most celebrated discourse on
the nature of professions generally, and the social work profes-
sion in particular, argues that "To generate valid theory that will
provide a solid base for professional techniques requires the
application of the scientific method to the service-related prob-
lems of the profession" (p. 76). In essence, professionals are to
become applied scientists.
Sch6n (1983) is highly critical of the Technical/Rationalist
model because it distorts, if not denies altogether, the actuality
of what most professionals know and do. It also comes tanta-
lizingly close to confusing method with essence and tends to
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belittle other ways of knowing and doing as either soft-headed
or subversive of rigor.
The professional as Technical/Rationalist becomes part of an
elite, bureaucratic and entrepreneurial, that institutionalizes the
positivist perspective (even though much of what passes for
science and technology would fail any positivistic test of rigor
and validity). No less a contributor to this hegemony, perhaps
even a result of it-it is difficult to say-is the rampant individu-
alizing or psychologizing of social misery. In our world, the
idiom and world view of capitalism, and the language and
judgment of the professions have become one. In a world where
the marketplace rules, a blithe ignorance of the historical evolu-
tion and political/economic configurations that abet what we
define as individual difficulties makes some sense. This "social
amnesia" (Jacoby, 1975) has cast the professions adrift from
social relevance so that some have evolved into a "jejune con-
glomeration of technical devices and methods" (Saleebey, 1987).
So, for example, it is not politic to raise serious social, and
economic, questions about why more women than men suffer
depression. It is far more lucrative, and amenable to the exten-
sion of available technology, whether pill, placebo, or panacea,
to treat each woman one by one as they troop through the office,
consulting room, or clinic. We do postulate some notions about
collective forces that may be involved but they usually are little
more than multipliers of the single case. In social work, there has
been notable effort to develop characterizations of the environ-
ment but even they may be somewhat debilitated by social
amnesia. Germain (1987), in her review of developmental theory
and the passing away of stage theories, gives a nod to the
mutually interactive effect of individual-environment relation-
ships, but speaks nary a word about the historical embedded-
ness of, or institutional pressures that drive, the course of
individual development. Jacoby (1975) says it well in his critique
of the individual psychologies that rule today's consciousness:
The convergence from contrasting directions on the impor-
tance of the subject as an emotional and psychic entity points
to a real development of society; not as apologists would
have it, that society has fulfilled basic material needs and is
moving to the higher reaches of liberation, but the reverse:
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domination is reaching the inner depths of men ahd women.
The last preserves of the autonomous individual are under
seige. (p. 17)
The Technical/Rationalist model, funded by the individual-
ist bias, has swept (or is sweeping) other points of view, looney
and legitimate alike, under the rug. To its credit, social work
resists, but these forces are impressively powerful and culture is
shot through with them. We should not, as a profession, engage
in the debate over rigor versus relevance until we are clear about
our identity, until we firmly understand what we are about, and
thus, can asses the epistemological questions from a sound
ontological vantage point.
The Ontological Issues Denied
As I said above, broad cultural forces conspire to embolden
the advocates of a "scientific" world view. These forces work as
well to sap the identity of the profession of social work.
Christopher Lasch, in two books (1979; 1984) has drawn a
portrait of contemporary culture shot through with "narciss-
ism", not the self-love of the overweening, strutting egoist, but
the self-doubt of an individual uncertain of the boundaries and
contours of the self, an individual who has trouble distin-
guishing between me and not-me, one who cannot comfortably
discern what is illusory and what is real about the self. Add to
this a miasma of disaster and threat permeating the culture-
"the threat of AIDS, the terrors of air flight, the looming of the
Big Earthquake", etc.-and you have individuals who must
travel light, avoid lengthy or profound personal commitments,
disavow emotional encumbrances, and ignore communal bur-
dens and responsibilities. Such penetrating themes in our cul-
ture make the very notion of social welfare, of caritas, of
responsibility to others quaint, if not frankly annoying. Social
workers live in this culture, too, and it is not far-fetched to
imagine that such themes and strains can make us deaf to our
basic commitments and raisons d'etre.
The gradual decline of New Deal sensibilities and the weak-
ening of the liberal agenda of the past few decades, and more
pointedly, over the last eight years, have also eroded the firm-
ness of our ontologic sense. Listen to Republicans and Demo-
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crats today talk about social welfare policy-if they do at all-
about the social good, and you might be listening to a cadre of
parvenus bat around stories about welfare "abusers." The error
here is to think, as some do, that the liberal quest has been
accomplished or to think, as others do, that it has abysmally
failed. But thinking either to be true, in a climate of political/
economic rationalism and restraint, dampens, in the profession
and outside it, the central ontological business of social work,
the pursuit of social justice. Recoiling, perhaps, from the ex-
cesses and failures of the 60s we find ourselves faced with a
public morality that reflects, more often than not, the credos and
prescriptions of the marketplace.
Not, then, simply the rise of the Technical/Rationalist con-
ception of the professions has led us to this debate, but wider
social and cultural trends compel us as well. Not only have they
conspired to make us less certain than we might be about who
we are, but they have suckered us into a debate which we
cannot competently argue until we more firmly establish a pro-
fessional identity.
The Ontology of Social Work
The word ontology promises more than I can deliver: all that
is intended here is a survey of what I regard as the symbolic and
existential infrastructure of our professional edifice. As you may
discover, if we accept these notions, two effects follow: social
work will never be, nor should it, like the other, more estab-
lished professions; in the academy, we must spit out the positi-
vist bit, and continue the search for a more thorough-going and
humane inquiry.
It was John Romanyshyn (1971) who, years ago, through the
power of his example, the clarity of his thinking, and the depth
of his commitment best exemplified what might be the existen-
tial heart of this profession. We begin, he suggested, we are
instructed and fueled by an ethic of indignation (Romanyshyn,
1972), not bloated self-righteousness, or mindless indignation,
but a palpable sense of hurt and outrage at indignities afflic-
ted-unjustly, unnecessarily, and often illegally-on people(s).
It is a kind of rectitude, even resentment, over acts and attitudes
which deny human dignity and thwart human possibility. It is a
Philosophical Disputes
sense that, in all ways, we should strive for and support the
triumphs of organism over machine, of home over institution, of
learning over profit, of identity over celebrity, of the real over
the illusory. This ethic requires that, in our small way, individu-
ally and collectively, we be stewards over the possibilities and
requisites of humanness, and, as is needed, advocates for those
who are oppressed, denied, misrepresented, and vulnerable.
Humane inquiry and understanding is part of the corpus of
social work (Hampden-Turner, 1970; Romanyshyn, 1971; Reason
and Rowan, 1981). We seek means of understanding that without
violating its meaning, or distorting its nature, can bring us closer
to the vagaries and mysteries of the human condition. Life is
awash in ambiguity, change, paradox, contradiction, and the
continuing tension between the possible and the thwarted, the
tragic and the hopeful. We are reluctant to give up our own
illusions and myths and to confront these sometimes discordant
and frightening elements of the human condition. But we must.
We do not want to lapse into the cheery bon mots of modern
pop-psych, to pin on the "smile button" that obfuscates the
genuine struggles and the real sadness that are the mortar of
civilization's bricks (Saleebey, 1987). Neither do we want to
wallow in a kind of European existential muck waiting for the
Godot of unkind fate. And we may not want to distantiate
ourselves from the objects of our interest and concern as the
positivists urge. To be conversant with the tragic, to be aware of
oppression is not to lose sight of the possibilities of liberation,
the turning of the dross of mechanical detached labor, emotional
numbness, and intellectual limit into the potential gold of eros-
sensual, natural energy, and individual and collective empower-
ment. To accept the tragic is liberating because, no longer
deluded, we can use our own powers of mind and body, our
will, and our ethic to restrict the scope of ignorance, fear, preju-
dice, and oppression. Having confronted it, we can resolve
to use the fruits of any inquiry in behalf of improving the human
condition.
A second presumption of humane inquiry is that such
inquiry is always participatory, a product of a mutual quest,
dialogue, and joint learning. Just the opposite, of course, typifies
the most elegant positivist mode of inquiry, the experiment. As
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Argyris (1975) says of this exquisite jewel in the empiricist
crown:
An experiment is a peculiar 'temporary' system. In order to
obtain as unambiguous evidence about causation as possible
and in order to control extraneous variables, the experimen-
ter strives to gain as much control as possible over the design
and execution of the experiment. (p. 474)
This is not a scenario in which one can easily discover the
elements of human experience, although one might conceivably
discover how people act when they are deceived, encouraged to
obey, and not allowed to learn. More humane inquiry, however,
rests on vastly different assumptions, and among these are that
reality is, in significant degree as far as humans are concerned,
constructed symbolically and through interpersonal negotiation;
that discovery of lawlike constructs and the causal links are
unlikely if not impossible goals, that research methodology is
participatory and idiographic, and that all theories, methods,
and questions for inquiry are enshrouded with values (Rodwell,
1987; Reason and Rowan, 1981).
A third ontological obligation of social work is focused com-
passion and caring, requiring of us a mimetic or empathic lens
through which to see; a stance toward the world of human
experience based on a profound appreciation of the root sim-
ilarities of the human condition for all of us, a positive affective
identification with others' humanness, a deep respect for others'
uniqueness, and an active resolve to participate in the gathering
of individual and group strengths, aspirations, and possibilities
(Rifkin, 1983). The manifestation of such caring is dialogue, a
peculiar sort of relationship between individuals based upon the
mutual appreciation and respect of two (or more) people
engaged in a joint project carried out in an affective matrix that
is loving, humble, hopeful, trusting, and dedicated to a critical
search for possibility, liberation, and empowerment within the
surrounding environment (Freire, 1973).
Dialogue is the only way, not only in vital questions of the
political order, but in all expressions of our being. Only by
virtue of faith, however, does dialogue have power and
meaning; by faith in man (read: humanity) and [its] possi-
Philosophical Disputes
bilities by the faith that I can only become truly myself when
other [individuals] also become themselves. (Jaspers, in
Freire, 1973, p. 45)
The last and most important element of our being is the quest
for social justice, and although the most resonant, it is possibly the
most difficult to pin down. Incapable of a philosophical treatise,
I can only offer some of the threads that, with others, form the
wholecloth of the social justice.
(a) Social resources are distributed on the principle of need with
the clear understanding that such resources underlie the
development of personal resources, with the proviso that
entitlement to such resources is one of the gifts of citizen-
ship.
(b) Opportunities for personal and social development are open
to all with the understanding that those who have been
unfairly hampered through no fault of their own will be
appropriately compensated.
(c) The establishment, at all levels of society, of agenda, and
policies that have human development and the enriching of
human experience as their essential goal and are understood
to take precedence over other agenda and policies is essen-
tial.
(d) The arbitrary exercise of social and political power is for-
saken.
(e) Oppression as a means for establishing priorities, for deve-
loping social and natural resources and distributing them,
and resolving social problems is forsworn.
These four cornerstones-indignation, inquiry, compassion,
and justice-have at least two important corollaries. The first is
that all human beings, even the most debilitated, defiled, and
disenfranchised, have strengths and potential and some capacity
to transform themselves. We do not give power to the people,
we encourage them to discover and employ the powers of the
self or of the people. Second, every human being exists in a web
of relationships, institutions, and sociohistorical circumstances
that are profoundly important in determining the possibilities of
liberation, transformation, or development.
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These first principles of our professional being, to the extent
that you accept them, precede our participation in the great
debate and suggest some of the terms of that debate.
(a) The personal is political: Even the most private problems of
relationship and consciousness have political and social
dimensions. In Jacoby's (1975) words: "... the isolation that
damns the individual to scrape along in a private world
derives from a public and social one" (p. 44).
(b) The politics of helping for social work centers on empower-
ment: We are committed to helping people discover and
employ the resources (knowledge, experience, motivations,
skills, relationships) that may have been suppressed by self-
limiting ideologies and oppressive institutional arrange-
ments. This requires that we focus on the strengths inherent
within individuals, groups, neighborhoods and commu-
nities.
(c) Insight is, first and foremost, inspired by social critique:
Transforming actions, strategies, and ideas are funded, in
part, by a peoples' capacity to see beyond the conventional
wisdom, and institutional ideologies and arrangements. The
anorexic young female, for example, must be helped in
understanding how her (and others) self-image, her very
identity is obscured and manipulated by the marketplace
and media, otherwise she remains at risk for other conse-
quences of a distorted and abused identity (Saleebey, 1987).
(d) Closeness to the people is essential: If we desire to help give
voice to the silent, advocate for the oppressed, we must
approach them in communion, and cooperation through
dialogue and not the implicitly required distance and
detachment of esoteric technique.
(e) Theories for practice focus on the dialectical nature of
human striving and interaction: The world of human experi-
ence is constructed of polarities, appositions, and tensions.
The usual inclination of individuals is to control such tension
through the suppression of one side of a dialectic that must
be elevated to consciousness if action and movement is to
be freed. For many males, as an example, one side of
their potential for liberated action has been buried under the
delicts of capitalism, commerce, and technology-the
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organic, sensual, caring part of their being has become alien.
Males, to be empowered more fully, must confront both the
instrumental and affective elements of their being.
Radicalism Redux
The preceding sounds suspiciously like an outworn radical
agenda, now virtually forgotten or, perhaps, thoroughly dis-
credited. Later radicalism waned as a significant social force
because it forgot its history, wallowed in excess or because it
failed to formulate an agenda for positive transformation. As a
profession, we cannot foist off these beliefs and principles on the
rest of society but we can, individually and collectively, pursue
them as we engage in the daily round of practice and citizen-
ship. If we fail to assert and follow them then we stand as one of
the legion of guardians of the status quo, as one of the minions
of social control or, perhaps more likely, as one of the corps of
petty bureaucrats of therapeutic tinkerers.
If we hope to enter the current epistemological debate
unfolding within the profession with vigor and resolution, our
ontological awareness and commitments must be heightened
and made formidable. To the extent that we do that, social
justice will not be denied, and we will stand as advocates for
relevance before rigor, and meaning before method.
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